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Introduction
The University of Oxford's Environmental Change Institute defines forest governance as the way that 'state and non-state institutions and actors shape decisions about the conservation and use of forest resources '. 3 This paper does two things -admittedly both in a preliminary, 'work in progress' fashion -in an exploration of the way that legality, illegality and criminality feature in those decisions and practices of forest governance. First, it examines the apparent disconnect between the literature on legality verification (LV) in the forest sector and what would seem to be a logical extension into the literature on forest crime and, more specifically, criminality. It is notable that issues of criminality and law enforcement are rarely mentioned in the growing body of work on legality verification, most of which emanates from scholars and practitioners working in an environmental or forest management context. In a similar fashion, the literature on the criminal aspects of trade associated with illegal logging -what Interpol and UNEP call 'black trade' and which is mainly the purview of the law enforcement and border protection community of practice -rarely discusses legality verification standards and practices.
The apparently logical overlap between these two areas of endeavour arises because both are dealing with aspects of supply chains or chains of custody involving raw timber, forest products or timber products more generally. While approaches to verification have focused on setting standards that can help to define legality and illegality, they have paid little attention to countervailing criminal efforts that seek to circumvent and violate domestic and international norms and challenge the authority of states and other private actors. The disconnect, I suggest here, may well arise because of a lack of 'joined up thinking' between the two themes that are central to forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) -that is, enforcement on the one hand and governance on the other. The former is frequently perceived to be relevant mainly to issues of criminality and the development of coercive responses by the state, the latter to normative standards and rules for defining legality and implementing verification.
This paper also accepts Cashore and Stone's proposition that single instrument approaches such as LV are necessary but not sufficient to 'ameliorate the multi-faceted nature of forest degradation'. 4 From a policy and regulatory perspective, these challenges require more than just disrupting illegal supply through strengthening domestic legislation -normative change -and ensuring that forestry agencies have appropriate skills and technical capacity to enforce that legislation -material change. This paper argues that the focus on (il)legality and governance in the global forest sector must be supplemented and complemented with a focus on criminality and enforcement.
The second purpose of this paper is to explore the role of 'agents beyond the state' in the spaces of transnational legality verification and forest law enforcement. laws and regulations. This encompasses more than those actions that specifically attract criminal as opposed to civil or administrative penalties in law. Criminality can also be understood in sociological terms as deviancy, 'subject to … social processes of censure and sanction'. 7 In our transnational environmental crime project, the way we define criminal activities (again, the character rather than the specific content) is also informed by the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organised Crime. 8 The Convention refers to intentional offences against domestic (and by extension international) laws that are undertaken with the aim of obtaining financial or other material benefit. This includes organising, direction, aiding and abetting such offences; or dealing with the proceeds through money-laundering, or through converting, transferring or disguising the illicit origins of property that constitutes the proceeds of crime. These kinds of activities take on a transnational form when, in effect, the planners, the perpetrators, the products or the profits (I refer to these as the 4 Ps of transnational crime) cross borders.
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Illicit international trafficking in forest products 10 The transnational trade in illegally logged timber -described by one observer as being of Measures are required at both the producer and consumer level -to protect forests from illegal logging and to ensure that timber products that reach the market are or can be certified as legal (and, often, as from sustainably managed forests). Legality verification has been one strategy by which governments have sought to meet forest governance challenges. The heart of LV lies in the elaboration of due diligence processes by which suppliers can ensure the legal status of raw materials used in the timber and forest products industries. This demands verification of both legal origin and legal compliance to provide markets with 'independent information about the origin of timber'. 22 Suppliers are expected to maintain documented chain of custody systems and to adopt strategies to enable them to evaluate the risk that illegally logged or sourced timber has been included in the supply chain. Forest managers, suppliers, and other entities involved in all stages of a supply chain need to participate if legality verification is to work effectively.
According to NEPCon's standard legality verification scheme, for material to be determined not to be associated with illegal activities, it must: 20 • originate from a forest that has been harvested according to applicable [national] legislation
• be transported, traded, and handled legally in the supply chain; and
• not be mixed with other material of illegal [or uncertain] origin.
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As well as avoiding timber that is illegally harvested, legal supply chains must also exclude conflict timber (timber extraction that funds groups involved in conflict situations associated with human rights abuses or crimes that violate international law including international humanitarian law). They must also exclude timber from countries that are the subject of international sanctions, and timber that is logged in ways that violate third party rights including those of forest-dwellers and local communities. Procedures that must be verified legal along the supply chain include declaration of species and quantity of timber products for customs, classification and reporting for appropriate fees and taxes, and the separation of certified timber from products of unknown or suspicious origin at all stages of transport and trade.
Tracking systems for tracing chains of custody are crucial to legality verification. 24 But they are auditing not enforcement strategies. They are necessary but not sufficient in the fight against illegal logging and timber trafficking. While they can play a 'significant role' in addressing the 'deep-seated problems of forest governance', relying on LV alone will fail 'because it does not address the underlying weaknesses that lead to illegality'. 25 logging is well documented. 37 Indeed, some commentators suggest that corruption should best be understood not as a pathology of the state but simply as an instrument of risk managementa strategy for doing business -for criminal groups. 38 Local officials, customs officers, police and the judiciary are bribed to overlook illegal shipments, to assist with false paper trails and forged documentation, to help evidence disappear during prosecutions, to delay or drop prosecutions, and even to return no convictions when cases are brought to trial. Syndicates running timber smuggling enterprises in Indonesia, for example, have "bought off local Indonesian customs officials and harbour masters" and used their influence to "have any attempted shipments by competitors stopped". 39 In their most extensive form, timber trafficking networks integrate criminal actors fully into the economic and political institutions of the state, often delivering them significant power and even, Serrano suggests, consolidating "exclusive governing authority". 40 Rather than being just the recipients of bribes, government officials, protection and enforcement officers, and politicians can take key roles as the organizers, facilitators and beneficiaries of illicit market networks. Police and military officers are known to be heavily involved in organizing and coordinating illegal logging in a number of countries in Southeast Asia or providing security for logging operations. 41 As with other forms of systematic criminal activity, this bribery and 52 See http://www.eia-international.org/wb_15_forests; in other areas of transnational environmental crime -such as wildlife crime -NGO representatives report being present at official interviews of crime suspects (see http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/world/asia/notorious-figure-in-animal-smuggling-beyond-reach-inlaos.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) 53 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Funding-opportunities/Not-for-profit-organisations/Governanceand-Transparency-Fund/GTF-programmes/Global-Witness-led-GTF-programme/ and by the nature of agency beyond the state. For Karkkainen, this constitutes more than a constraint on the exercise of state sovereignty. Rather it implies the 'partial disaggregation or unbundling and reassignment of powers traditionally thought to be among sovereignty's most essential attributes'. 54 There is, as a result, no clarity on whether the involvement of NGOs in forest regulation, governance and enforcement is a challenge to sovereignty, a function of weak sovereignty, or whether it can actually serve to strengthen state capacity. To some extent, the involvement of NGOs can be seen as a response to the inadequacies and incapacities of the 
